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RETHINKING DRUG INADMISSIBILITY
NANCY MORAWETZ*
ABSTRACT
Changes in federal statutory policy, state criminal justice laws, and
federal enforcement initiatives have led to an inflexible and zero-
tolerance immigration policy with respect to minor drug use. This
Article traces the evolution of the statutory scheme and how various
provisions in state and federal law interact to create the current
policy. Itproceeds to investigate the broad reach of these rules if they
are fully enforced, in light of the widespread lifetime experience with
minor drug use both in the United States and abroad. Drawing on
the experience of law enforcement agencies that have abandoned
similarly rigid rules, the Article proposes changes to the immigration
law that would better reflect societal standards with respect to the
appropriate lifetime consequences of past drug use. Finally, the
Article argues that more systemic reform depends on developing
mechanisms that will better insulate the specific criteria for denying
admission from the one-way political ratchet of episodic congressio-
nal oversight.
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INTRODUCTION
In early 2007, the press debated whether candidate Barack
Obama's admission of past cocaine use would spell the end of his bid
for the presidency.' Eleven years earlier, then-candidate George
Bush was more cautious in his admissions, stating that he could
honestly deny any drug use over the previous twenty-five years.2
Bush was careful not to provide a lifetime answer to the questions
of the press and refused to answer specific questions about whether
he had used drugs before he turned twenty-eight.3 The press around
Obama and Bush included active debate about the scope to which
public officials should be subjected to scrutiny about any past drug
use.4 But the statements of both Obama and Bush reflect a common
assessment that drug use that is far enough in the past or has been
followed by a clean record should not serve to disqualify them from
public office. This assessment matched the polls, where 84 percent
of voters said that they did not think that proof of cocaine use in his
twenties should disqualify Bush from the presidency.5 Indeed, in the
domestic sphere, the reality of some past drug use in a large
segment of the adult population is so well-recognized that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), along with police depart-
ments around the country, have altered hiring practices so that
admission of past drug use no longer automatically disqualifies an
applicant for a position as an agent.6
1. See, e.g., Lois Romano, Effect of Obama's Candor Remains To Be Seen, WASH. POST,
Jan. 3, 2007, at Al.
2. See, e.g., CNN.com, Bush Faces New Round of Drug Questions, Aug. 20, 1999,
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/08/20/president.2000/bush.drug/.
3. See, e.g., Online NewsHour, The Drug Question, Aug. 20, 1999, http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/ medialjuly-dec99/bush_8-20.html.
4. Id.
5. See Bush Faces New Round of Drug Questions, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigations, Background Investigation, Employment
Drug Policy, http://www.fbijobs.gov/52.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2008) (barring those who
answer yes to any of the following questions: "Have you used marijuana at all within the last
three years? Have you used any other illegal drug (including anabolic steroids after February
27, 1991) at all in the past 10 years? Have you ever sold any illegal drug for profit? Have you
ever used an illegal drug (no matter how many times or how long ago) while in a law
enforcement or prosecutorial position, or in a position which carries with it a high level of
responsibility or public trust").
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In the immigration realm, the situation is completely different.
At the questioning stage, there is no limit to the time span for which
immigrants are expected to reveal past drug use. The standard
application to adjust status to lawful permanent residence asks
applicants: "Have you ever, in or outside the United States:
knowingly committed ... a drug related offense for which you have
not been arrested?"7 Once answers are provided, the law is ex-
tremely unforgiving. As rewritten in 1990, the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) provides that an admission of a violation of a
controlled substance law bars admission to the United States.8
There is no provision for excluding old offenses. And unlike the
other major criminal ground of inadmissibility,,there is no exception
for those who were under eighteen at the time of the crime or who
were convicted of a petty offense.9 Furthermore, the general waiver
for criminal grounds of inadmissibility is unavailable for anything
other than a single instance of possession of marijuana in an
amount under thirty grams, an amount which is less than an
ounce.
10
In addition, the FBI policy bars those who have been convicted of a felony or who are
current users. Id. at Employment Disqualifiers, http//www.fbijobs.gov/51.asp (last visited
Sept. 25, 2008). Prior to December 2006, the FBI had a more rigid policy that barred those
who admitted using marijuana more than fifteen times in their lifetime. See Ted Bridis, FBI
Revisits Policy on Drug Use, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2005, at A15; see also BRUCE TAYLOR ET AL.,
COP CRUNCH: IDENTIFYING STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE RECRUITING AND HIRING CRISIS
IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 12 (2006), available at http:I/www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/
213800.pdf (describing a growing tendency among police departments to tolerate some history
of drug use).
7. Dep't of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 1-485, Application to
Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, at 3, available at http//www.uscis.gov/files/
formli-485.pdf.
8. Section 212 of the INA makes inadmissible
any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits
committing acts which constitute the essential elements of ... a violation of (or
a conspiracy ... to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or
a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of
Title 21).
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2000)
[hereinafter INA].
9. Section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)-providing an exception to inadmissibility under section
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)--only applies to the inadmissibility ground for crimes involving moral
turpitude under § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Id. § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
10. Id. § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2000).
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The potential sweep of the drug inadmissibility ground is
breathtaking. Various studies of lifetime drug use in the American
population show that experimentation with drugs is the norm
rather than the exception." Furthermore, these studies rely on self-
reporting of conscious use of illicit drugs. 2 The criminal law has
evolved so that possession is now typically a strict liability crime in
which mere presence in a location where there are drugs is suffi-
cient to prove constructive possession, and there are no meaningful
defenses to a charge of possession."3 If the immigration law were
applied to truly screen out every applicant who, at some time in
his or her life, could have been prosecuted under the broad strict
liability drug possession laws of the United States, it is easy to
imagine even larger numbers, if not virtually all, of those selected
for immigration based on family ties or business need would be
excluded.
It is time for policymakers to review the standards for barring
immigrants based on past violations of drug laws. Any inadmissibil-
ity rule denies admission to the very people who are identified by
law as those we are most interested in having immigrate. Whether
that group is made up of family members and those sponsored by
business (as reflected in current law)'4 or a point system (as
proposed in the "Grand Bargain" debated in 2007),"6 the immigra-
tion laws are designed to identify persons who the United States has
an interest in bringing or keeping in this country. Because drug
inadmissibility sweeps so broadly, it has the potential to exclude
arbitrarily many worthy immigrants. On that basis alone, the
standards are worthy of examination.
Furthermore, the current law emerged from an inattentive
legislative process. As a result of a series of legislative amend-
ments-many of which were accompanied by no explanation from
11. See infra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
13. See MARKUS D. DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME 32-39 (2002).
14. See generally INA § 202, 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000).
15. The "Grand Bargain" refers to a proposal that a number of senators introduced in the
spring of 2007 to alter the immigration system as part of comprehensive immigration reform.
A summary of its features can be found at AILA InforNet, available at http://www.aila.org/
content/default.aspx?docid=22365 (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
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Congress 6 or explanations that indicated that Congress had no
intent to expand these groundsl'-the drug inadmissibility ground
has lost the conventional moorings for limiting the breadth of
inadmissibility grounds. First, it is based on a pure cross-reference
to the laws regulating drugs that are enacted by states or foreign
governments.'" It has no significant separate federal content-as
with laws governing crimes involving moral turpitude-which limits
the scope of offenses. As a result, it is hostage to state laws that
have dispensed with basic safeguards of the criminal law, such as
mens rea, in delimiting criminal liability. 9 Second, since 1990, the
drug ground can be triggered without a conviction, and yet it lacks
basic exceptions for petty offenses that are recognized for the other
significant inadmissibility ground,20 which reaches crimes classified
as "involving moral turpitude."'" Given the prevalence of lifetime
drug use, the lack of any exception for petty offenses assures that
the drug ground reaches minor conduct in excluding worthy
applicants for admission. Third, the drug ground is written in a way
that ossifies the exceptions for more innocuous use identified in the
past. 2 As applied today, any new drug that the federal government
chooses to recognize as worthy of being treated as a controlled
substance is automatically treated as a ground of inadmissibility
and as not worthy of any exception. Fourth, the drug inadmissibility
ground is particularly out of step with public values, as reflected in
the polls surrounding inquiry into President Bush's possible past
drug use.23
So long as drug inadmissibility can be triggered by a concession,
rather than a conviction, reform is also necessary to preserve the
integrity of the immigration process. Questions that seek admis-
sions from immigrant applicants for visas and then provide no
safety valve for fair consideration of the responses encourage
applicants to lie. This is bad for the applicants and bad for the
16. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 49.
18. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part II.B.1.
20. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
21. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
22. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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immigration system. It breeds contempt for the process, discourages
honesty, and rewards dishonesty.
The drafters of the immigration law should learn from the
experience of employers who have rejected the kind of zero-
tolerance, one-size-fits-all approach that is reflected in the current
drug inadmissibility grounds.24 Although many employers are
restricted by law from inquiring into past drug use, certain federal
employers are exempted from these restrictions.25 Among these
federal employers, the FBI has experimented with a policy that was
almost, although not quite, as severe as the standards in current
immigration law.26 But with experience, the FBI rejected such a
zero-tolerance policy because it screened out worthy potential
employees.27 If the FBI can recognize the folly of inflexible rules that
screen out our job candidates with past drug use or misdemeanor
convictions, then certainly the immigration system, which is not
hiring for such sensitive positions, but is instead making decisions
about reuniting family and attracting talent for the workplace,
should be able to do so as well.
Part I of this Article examines key aspects of current drug
inadmissibility grounds, and the legislative origins of these policies.
Part II explores how criminal justice policies and general changes
in immigration law and enforcement have affected the conse-
quences of the drug inadmissibility criteria. Part III presents the
case for legislative reform. Finally, Part IV proposes large and small
measures that Congress could undertake to achieve a more rational
policy on drug inadmissibility.2
24. See infra Part III.B.
25. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
28. This Article does not address the proper scope of two additional features of the
inadmissibility law as it relates to drugs: (1) the bar on admission for drug addiction that is
included in the health-related grounds of inadmissibility, INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2000); and (2) the bar on admission of persons whom the border official has
"reason to believe" is or has been a drug trafficker. Id. § 212(a)(2)(C). This Article also does
not examine drug deportability standards and the grounds for treating a drug offense as an
"aggravated felony" that bars most forms of relief. See generally Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S.
47 (2006) (holding that a drug possession conviction is not an aggravated felony by virtue of
being a state felony); In re Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 2007)
(concluding that a subsequent possession offense that was not prosecuted as a recidivist crime
is not an aggravated felony).
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I. THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF DRUG INADMISSIBILITY
LAWS
Rules excluding those with a criminal past are a longstanding
aspect of the immigration law.29 But even within that context, the
rules on drug crimes stick out like a sore thumb. As Professor Steve
Legomsky has observed, the drug inadmissibility rules are unusu-
ally unforgiving.3" They reach crimes committed by minors, crimes
for which the only penalty was a sentence of probation, crimes that
are classified as misdemeanors, and even offenses that are treated
as violations and not crimes under state law. Moreover, for a wide
array of drug offenses, there is no available waiver, irrespective of
the length of time since the offense or the extreme hardship that
will be sustained by immediate family members.3
Thirty years ago, drug inadmissibility rules hit the popular press
when the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) sought to
deport John Lennon. Lennon had been admitted to the United
States on a temporary basis when he and his wife, Yoko Ono, sought
to obtain custody of her daughter from a previous marriage."
Lennon, who had a past conviction for possession of cannibis resin,
was treated as "excludable" because of this conviction.33 He was
permitted into the United States, however, through a waiver that is
29. Many scholars have commented on the punitive and extreme nature of immigration
provisions that are related to a past crime. See, e.g., Jennifer Chac6n, Whose Community
Shield?: Examining the Removal of the "Criminal Street Gang Member," 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 317, 340-43 (2007) (exploring the use of gang association labels to criminalize and deport
noncitizens without regard to criminal convictions); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social
Control and Punishment: Some Thoughts on Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1889 (2000) (discussing generally the increasing convergence of immigration and
criminal law); Teresa Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New
Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 613-14 (2003) (placing punitive aspects of immigration
law in the context of broader punitive developments in criminal justice policy).
30. See Steven Legomsky, Reforming the Criteria for the Exclusion and Deportation of
Alien Criminal Offenders, 12 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 64, 65-66 (1990).
31. The only waiver is § 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This waiver is
limited to a single use of a small quantity of marijuana and requires either that the crime be
fifteen years old or that the applicant be able to show extreme hardship to a lawful permanent
resident or citizen parent, spouse, or child. INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2000).
32. Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 1975).
33. Id. at 188.
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available to temporary visitors.34 When Lennon sought to obtain
permanent status based on his status as an exceptional artist,
however, his application was denied on the ground that there was
no waiver available for permanent immigrants with past drug
convictions.3 5 Lennon proceeded to wage a four-year battle to obtain
legal status. 6 Ultimately, he prevailed.3
Lennon's case serves as a useful backdrop to understanding
current immigration law governing persons who have violated drug
laws. Lennon prevailed by arguing that the law only applied to
convictions for "illicit" possession of a prohibited drug.3" His lawyers
argued that Lennon's conviction was under a statute that did not
require the defendant to have any guilty knowledge.39 In Lennon's
case, the drug had been found among his possessions in his
apartment.4 ° Judge Kaufman, writing for the panel in the Second
Circuit, agreed that the British law would permit a conviction even
when the defendant was wholly unaware of the presence of the
drug, and therefore reversed the order of deportation in Lennon's
case.41 The media closely followed Lennon's case, and Lennon gained
widespread support in his bid to remain in the United States.42 But
changes in the law enacted in the decade following his victory would
have prevented that victory from happening.
Since Lennon's case, there have been three major changes to the
law governing past violations of drug laws. Two of these expanded
the grounds of exclusion (now termed "inadmissibility"). One
provided a small window for humanitarian waivers. The two
changes that expanded grounds of exclusion followed the all-too-
familiar pattern of enactment without any explanation or public
34. Id. at 189.
35. Id. at 190.
36. Id. at 195.
37. Id.; Arnold H. Lubasch, Deportation of Lennon Barred by Court of Appeals, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 1975, at 42.
38. Lennon, 527 F.2d at 190, 193.
39. Id. at 190.
40. Id. at 188.
41. Id. at 192.
42. See, e.g., David Bird, Lindsay Deplores Action to Deport Lennons as a 'Grave Injustice,'
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1972, at 33; Albin Krebs, Lennon's Deportation Hearing is Delayed, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 1972, at 33.
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debate.43 Altogether, they create a package of laws that sweep far
wider than those that the INS sought to use to deport John Lennon.
A. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
The first significant expansion of the drug excludability category
came in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986." According to press
reports, this legislation was rushed through Congress in a matter
of weeks following the widely reported drug-related death of Len
Bias, a popular basketball star from the Washington, D.C. area.4"
An amendment that overturned the key to the Lennon opinion was
a very minor provision in this enormous piece of legislation. Instead
of requiring that possession offenses be "illicit," the new legislation
rewrote the drug exclusion ground to cross-reference any law or
regulation of a state or foreign country "relating to" a controlled
substance, as that term is defined by federal law.46
The elimination of any knowledge element in the drug exclusion
ground opened the way for drug exclusion to automatically expand
43. See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, The Invisible Border: Restrictions on Short-Term Travel
by Noncitizens, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201, 210 (2007) [hereinafter Morawetz, Invisible Border]
(describing lack of congressional attention to the change in treatment of lawful permanent
residents with past criminal offenses who travel); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact
of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1936, 1955 n.106 (2000) [hereinafter Morawetz, 1996 Deportation Laws] (describing last-
minute unexplained changes to the bars to relief from removal); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking
Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 152 (1998)
[hereinafter Morawetz, Retroactive Deportation Laws] (describing lack of attention to changes
in the stop time rule).
44. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1751, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-47
(1986).
45. See, e.g., Peter Kerr, Anatomy of the Drug Issue: How, After Years, It Erupted, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1986, at Al.
46. Subtitle M of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was entitled the "Narcotics Traffickers
Deportation Act." Section 1751(a) amended the drug exclusion ground in § 212(a)(23) of the
INA:
(1) by striking out "any law or regulation relating to" and all that follows
through "addiction-sustaining opiate" and inserting in lieu thereof "any law or
regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a
controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act
(21 U.S.C. 802))"; and
(2) by striking out "any of the aforementioned drugs" and inserting in lieu
thereof "any such controlled substance."
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1751, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
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with state laws that made prosecution easy. If a state allowed
constructive possession to support a conviction, then the federal law
would treat that as a ground of exclusion. Similarly, if the state
eliminated a defense, the federal law would follow suit. All that
mattered under this new formulation is whether the state offense is
properly categorized as "relating to" a controlled substance.
This seemingly technical change had enormous implications for
the administration of the immigration law. In general, the key to
criminal exclusion or deportation grounds is whether the federal
category matches the requirement for a conviction under the
relevant state law of the offense for which the individual was
convicted.4" In the case of state laws on passing bad checks, for
example, the immigration law question is whether the state
conviction can be classified as a "crime involving moral turpitude."
Where state law requires proof that the individual meant to pass a
bad check, the crime is classified as a crime involving moral
turpitude. But where the state has dispensed with the mens rea
element, and instead allows a presumption of bad intent when the
individual lacked the funds to pay the check, the conviction cannot
be classified as a crime involving moral turpitude.4" If the state
crime need only relate to the same subject as the federal crime, no
such correspondence in the scope of criminal liability is necessary.
In the case of drug crimes, as will be discussed in Part I.B, this
automatic expansion of the federal exclusion category has had
enormous implications.
B. The Immigration Act of 1990
The second major expansion in the drug exclusion ground
came in 1990. In 1990, Congress overhauled the exclusion provi-
sions in an effort to change "outmoded" grounds of exclusion.49 The
47. Morawetz, 1996 Deportation Laws, supra note 43, at 109 n.46.
48. Compare In re Balao, 20 I&N Dec. 440, 444 (BIA 1992) (holding that because intent
to defraud is not an essential element of the crime of passing bad checks under Pennsylvania
law, a conviction under Pennsylvania law is not a conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude), with In re Khalik, 17 I&N Dec. 518, 519 (BIA 1980) (holding that because the
Michigan offense of issuance of a check without sufficient funds includes the element of intent
to defraud, such a conviction constitutes a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude).
49. The conference report stated:
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legislative history of the 1990 Act contains substantial discussion of
many of these revisions. For example, the legislative history
discusses the elimination of the exclusion ground based on sexual
orientation" and the revision of grounds based on physical and
mental disorders or on political beliefs.5 There was no explanation,
however, of the changes to the criminal grounds for exclusion. It
appears that participants understood the conference substitute
mainly as a reorganization of existing grounds and not as a set of
substantive changes.52
The 1990 changes, however, were very significant. Prior to 1990,
the drug exclusion ground was a separate subsection of the INA.53
The 1990 amendments revised the long list of exclusion grounds and
collected them into categories governing health, criminal, and other
grounds. The criminal grounds were grouped in INA § 212(a)(2),
with the first subsection including both the longstanding provision
regarding "crimes involving moral turpitude" (CIMT) and the
ground for crimes "relating to" a controlled substance.54 These two
grounds, however, had different triggers and exceptions. The ground
for CIMTs had historically been applied both to those convicted of
a crime and to those who admit having committed such crime, or to
those who admit to having committed acts that constituted the
essential elements of such crime.5 It included exceptions, however,
The House amendment repealed several outmoded grounds for exclusion based
on health and replaced them with a general exclusion based on a mental or
physical disorder which could endanger the alien or others and a second ground
based on drug abuse or addiction.
The Senate bill had no comparable provision.
The conference substitute provides for a comprehensive revision of all the
existing grounds for exclusion and deportation, including the repeal of outmoded
grounds, the expansion of waivers for certain grounds, the substantial revision
of security and foreign policy grounds, and the consolidation of related grounds
in order to make the law more rational and easy to understand.
H.R. REP. No. 101-955, at 128 (1990) (Conf. Rep.).
50. H.R. REP. No. 101-723, pt. 1, at 56 (1990) (Conf. Rep.).
51. See supra note 49.
52. A key player in the 1990 reforms, Bruce Morrison, reports that there was little
attention paid to how the redesigned inadmissibility grounds altered the standards for
inadmissibility based on drug violations. Conversation with Bruce Morrison, Former Chair,
Immigration Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee (May 22, 2007).
53. INA § 212(a)(23), S U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23) (1988).
54. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(I) (1990).
55. See id.
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for those who committed one crime while under the age of eighteen,
and five years prior to the application for admission, or who had
only one offense that is classified as a petty offense.56 The ground for
drug exclusion had no such exceptions. However, drug exclusion was
only triggered by a conviction. As rewritten in 1990, and as in force
today, the drug exclusion ground was expanded to include the CIMT
trigger of an admission.58 But there was no similar incorporation of
the exceptions for CIMTs that are youthful or petty offenses.
By expanding the drug ground to include admissions, Congress
opened up the possibility that a wide range of statements in various
contexts could be seen as grounds for exclusion. The danger is that
virtually any admission of past drug use made in response to a
question on an immigration application will serve as a bar to im-
migration.
The 1990 change may have seemed innocuous to drafters because
of the very limited application of the admission ground in the
context of CIMTs. Well before 1990, for instance, agency case law
had developed in ways that greatly circumscribed the applicability
of the admission ground. First, in a series of decisions, the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruled that where there has been a
criminal arrest, the BIA would defer to the outcome of the proceed-
ing to determine whether the individual is excludable, notwith-
standing any admissions that were made in the course of the
proceeding. 9 Second, the BIA had ruled that in order for an
admission of a crime to trigger the exclusion ground, the admission
must be voluntary and must be made following an explanation of
the elements of the crime to which the individual was admitting. °
Due to these two developments in agency case law, the CIMT
admission ground swept far more broadly on paper than it did in
practice. In a case where the government argued that the record
showed that a respondent admitted to making false statements
under oath, for example, the BIA ruled that the admission was not
56. Id.
57. See supra note 20.
58. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(i)(A)(II) (2000).
59. See, e.g., In re Seda, 17 I&N Dec. 550 (BIA 1980); In re Winter, 12 I&N Dec. 638, 642
(BIA 1968).
60. See, e.g., In re G, 1 I&N Dec. 225, 227 (BIA 1940) (admission of false statements under
oath insufficient to establish admission of perjury).
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of perjury because the individual had not been presented with a
definition of the elements of perjury.6'
The elements of drug crimes and the multiple ways of obtaining
admissions of past drug use, however, pose a serious danger that
exclusion based on admission of drug violations will sweep far more
broadly. That potential sweep is evident in a decision from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe,62
the petitioner was a Philippine immigrant who obtained a visa from
the American embassy in the Philippines to join his mother as a
permanent resident of the United States.63 As part of the application
for a visa, Pazcoguin had been examined by a doctor-to whom he
had admitted that he had used marijuana over a four-year period
ending when he was twenty-one.' When Pazcoguin arrived in the
United States, he was further questioned about his marijuana use.65
Ultimately, he was placed in removal proceedings.66
On appeal, Pazcoguin made two major arguments. First, he
argued that his use of marijuana was not necessarily a crime
because Philippine law provides a defense that may have been
available had he ever been charged with possession of marijuana. 67
Second, he argued that since he had not been provided with a
definition and the essential elements of the crime, his admission did
not meet the requirements of agency case law circumscribing which
statements qualify as admissions. 6' The Ninth Circuit rejected both
arguments. It concluded that the "essential elements" of a drug
crime do not include defenses.69 It further concluded that while the
immigration inspector was duty-bound to provide Pazcoguin with a
definition and the essential elements of the crime of possession or
use of marijuana under Philippine law, no such obligation applied
with respect to the doctor who had obtained admissions in the
61. Id.
62. 292 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2002). Judge Berzon's dissent is reported at 308 F.3d 934 (9th
Cir. 2002).
63. Pazcoquin, 292 F.3d at 1212.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1214.
68. Id. at 1216.
69. Id. at 1214.
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Philippines."0 As a result, Pazcoguin's honest answer to a medical
professional in connection with an application for admission sealed
his fate. Judge Berzon dissented on both grounds. She criticized the
majority for placing form over substance in ignoring available
defenses under Philippine law.7 ' She also argued that the interests
in "fair play" applied equally to an admission to both a medical
professional and to an immigration inspector.72
Although other circuits have yet to weigh in on the issues pre-
sented in Pazcoguin, the case illustrates the potentially widespread
implications of the 1990 changes providing for inadmissibility based
on admissions of drug law violations. Medical examinations are a
standard part of the permanent visa issuance process, and questions
about drug use can easily arise in this context. There is no similar
standard examination that would elicit admissions on other
criminal grounds where the law does not require a conviction. For
example, although an admission of wrongdoing can be sufficient to
bar an immigrant who engaged in a crime classified as a CIMT
(such as unauthorized use of cable service or other forms of theft of
service), this information would not ordinarily be part of an immi-
grant's file. But because of the medical examination, it is not
unusual for the files of immigrants to include answers to questions
about former drug use, thereby triggering scrutiny of whether the
immigrant passes the criminal grounds for admissibility. Further-
more, the case law requirement that officials present an applicant
with a statement of the elements of the offense before an "admis-
sion" will be treated as sufficient to prove the violation73 has far less
force with the drug inadmissibility ground than it does with the
CIMT ground. Because drug crimes are drafted in expansive ways,
there is often little that needs to be proved, and therefore there are
few elements that would have to be clear to a person making an
admission.
70. Id. at 1218.
71. Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 308 F.3d 934,936-38 (9th Cir. 2002) (reporting Judge Berzon's
dissent).
72. Id. at 938-39.
73. See, e.g., In re E.N., 7 I&N Dec. 153, 155 (BIA 1956) (requiring that the individual
admit all of the factual elements of the crime).
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C. The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981
In addition to these two expansive changes to the drug exclusion
ground, one amendment ameliorated the reach of this ground: the
waiver of the drug exclusion ground that Congress created in 1981.74
This amendment, however, is very limited. It allows for a waiver
of drug inadmissibility only with respect to a single offense for
possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana.75 In addition, this
waiver is available only when the individual can show that the
waiver is necessary to prevent extreme hardship to a citizen or
lawful permanent resident parent, spouse, or child.7"
Unlike the prior two changes, the 1981 amendment appears to
have been the result of more conscious congressional attention. It
illustrates, however, the politically charged nature of efforts to
reform drug inadmissibility rules. In the years leading up to the
1981 amendments, Congress had passed many private bills seeking
waivers of drug inadmissibility rules.77 Each of these bills was based
on the compelling story of a person with strong ties to the United
States who was barred from obtaining permanent status due to a
past drug offense.7" At the time, the drug inadmissibility ground had
not yet been amended to reach conduct without a conviction.79 As a
result, all of these private bills involved persons with drug convic-
tions.80 In some cases, there was more than one conviction." In some
cases, there was a trafficking offense. 2 And in some, there was a
conviction for a drug other than marijuana.8 3
74. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, 95 Stat.
1611, 1616 (1981).
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See generally BERNADETTE MAGUIRE, IMMIGRATION: PUBLIC LEGISLATION AND PRIVATE
BILLS 149, 174-179 (1997).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. E.g., id. at 177 (describing case of a private bill for a spouse of a U.S. citizen who had
two convictions of possession of cannibis and hemp seed).
82. E.g., id. (describing case of a spouse of a U.S. citizen serving in the Air Force, who had
been convicted of trafficking in hashish).
83. E.g., id. (describing case of a spouse of a U.S. citizen serving in the Army who had
been convicted of giving two individuals sixty-nine tablets of valium); id. at 176 (describing
case of a spouse of a U.S. citizen who had been convicted of possession of cocaine, heroin, and
178 [Vol. 50:163
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Prompted by these private bills, Congress entertained general
legislation that would provide the INS and the State Department
with the authority to waive drug inadmissibility. In 1979, the House
considered a proposal that would have provided broad authority to
waive drug inadmissibility.' Both the State Department and the
INS supported the proposal, noting that they had encountered
extreme hardship cases for which they lacked the authority to grant
waivers." The following year, the House issued a report reaffirming
its judgment that there was a need for greater flexibility in cases
involving non-trafficking offenses.8" In both cases, the discussions
centered on the need for broad flexibility, without a limitation based
on the type of drug or the lack of a second offense.
In 1981, the year that the amendments passed, the admin-
istration urged that the waiver be limited to a single possessory
offense. 7 The House proceeded to follow this counsel and limited its
proposed waiver to simple possession of marijuana.8 8 When the bill
reached the Senate floor, a floor amendment further narrowed the
reach of the waiver. Senator Simpson proposed an amendment that
limited waivers to a single offense of simple possession of thirty
grams or less of marijuana.89 The amendment was agreed to without
any further discussion.'
By the time Congress had completed its work on the 1981
amendment, it had whittled down the scope of relief considerably.
Although members expressed confidence that the legislation
eliminated the need for many private bills,"1 the legislation did not
morphine).
84. H.R. 5087, 96th Cong. (1979).
85. Efficiency of the Immigration and Naturalization Service: Hearing on H.R. 5087 Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int7 Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong. 3 (1979) (statement of David Crosland, Acting Comm'r, Immigration and Naturalization
Service); id. at 30 (statement of Elizabeth Harper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa
Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State).
86. H.R. REP. No. 96-1301, at 67 (1980).
87. See INS Efficiency Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 2043 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, and Int'l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 49, 53, 58
(1981) (statement of Hon. Doris Meissner, Acting Comm'r, Immigration and Naturalization
Service).
88. 127 CONG. REC. 23,776 (1981) (statement of Rep. McClory).
89. Id. at 32,008 (statement of Sen. Simpson).
90. Id. at 32,009.
91. Id. at 22,051.
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even reach many circumstances that Congress had previously
found worthy of a private bill. The person whose controlled sub-
stance crime involved valium, or who had more than one past
offense, was not covered by the waiver. 2 Moreover, by relying on the
one drug offense that seemed worthy of a waiver at that time-a
single use of a small amount of marijuana9 3-Congress ossified the
law in terms of then-existing norms and the then-existing list of
drugs on the federal list of controlled substances. As a result, any
new drug added to the schedules of controlled substances automati-
cally becomes a ground of inadmissibility,94 and there is no safety
valve in terms of an exception for minor possession. As is often the
case with criminal immigration issues, Congress ultimately relied
on the labels of the offenses95 and not on the range of equities-such
as cases involving the spouses of members of the U.S. military-in
determining whether relief would not be provided.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES IN SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND
ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES ON THE REACH OF THE DRUG
INADMISSIBILITY GROUND ON UNITED STATES RESIDENTS
Between 1986 and 1990, changes to the legal structure of the drug
inadmissibility ground paved the way for a far harsher and more
inflexible approach to admission of immigrants who had used any
drugs in the past. The implications of the new legal architecture,
however, were not fully realized at the time these provisions were
enacted. Instead, their implications have grown over time as
Congress has expanded the use of the drug inadmissibility ground
to govern an increasing number of rights and remedies under the
immigration law, as the list of controlled substances has expanded,96
and as the criminal law governing drug prosecutions has made it
92. Immigration and Nationalization Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, 95
Stat. 1611, 1612, 1616 (1981).
93. Id.
94. 21 U.S.C. § 802(b) (2000) (defining "controlled substance" for the purpose of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(II) as "a drug or other substance" listed in the federal substance schedules).
95. See generally Morawetz, 1996 Deportation Laws, supra note 43.
96. See, e.g., Placement of Pregabalin into Schedule V, 70 Fed. Reg. 43, 633-35 (July 28,
2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308); Placement of Butorphanol into Schedule IV, 62
Fed. Reg. 51,370 (Oct. 1, 1997) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308); Placement of Zopiclone
into Schedule IV, 70 Fed. Reg. 16,935-37 (Apr. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308).
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easier to obtain convictions.97 In addition, enforcement policy with
respect to both immigration and drugs has changed in ways that
threaten to affect even more immigrants. Altogether, these changes
mean that the inadmissibility criteria now reach more people with
stronger ties and more minimal offenses.
A. The Immigration Law Context
1. Formal Structure of the Immigration Laws and the Impact of
Admissibility Rules on United States Residents
The most obvious group affected by drug inadmissibility criteria
are those who are abroad and seek to immigrate to the United
States. But while the drug inadmissibility ground is found in the
section of the INA that pertains to admission of new immigrants,98
it has profound implications for persons who are already in the
United States. Through cross-references to the inadmissibility
provisions, Congress has imported these criteria into other aspects
of the immigration law that affect a wide array of noncitizens
present in the United States, including lawful permanent residents.
Admissibility rules and limits to waivers under § 212(h) of the
INA affect all immigrants provided with permanent visas.99 Recent
statistics show that more than half of these persons are already in
the United States and are therefore more likely to have strong ties
within the United States. 00 Many will be adjusting their status
from a temporary status, such as a student or a temporary business
visa holder.' Others are adjusting through spousal petitions or
other routes to adjustment that do not require a departure from
the United States.'0 2 In addition, many seeking permanent visas
through the consular process will have strong ties in the form of
family and employment relationships.0 3
97. See infra Part II.B.
98. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2000).
99. INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2000).
100. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2006 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 18
(2007).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Enid Trucious-Haynes, CivilRights, Latinos, andImmigration: Cybercascadesand
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Inadmissibility rules also serve as a baseline for virtually all
proposals to legalize undocumented immigrants in the United
States. Proposals for comprehensive immigration reform in 2007 all
included, as a minimal requirement, that the individual be "admissi-
ble." °4 Similarly, the much heralded "DREAM Act," which provides
a path to legal status for immigrants who were brought to the
United States as children, requires that they establish that they are
"admissible" both when they first register for temporary status and
when they later adjust to permanent resident status. 10 5 Even a
single violation related to a small amount of marijuana cannot be
waived.
In addition to this direct role of inadmissibility in determining
who is eligible to immigrate, changes in the immigration law have
created cross-references to the "inadmissibility" ground as a basis
for limiting important forms of relief from removal for those who are
present in the United States. Consider, for example, limits on
cancellation of removal for persons who are not lawful permanent
residents.0 6 Under the 1996 immigration law reforms, cancellation
of removal is restricted to situations in which the applicant can
show that "removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child" who is a
citizen or a legal permanent resident (LPR).'07 But cancellation is
unavailable to any person who cannot prove "good moral character"
for the previous ten years.0 8 "Good moral character" is defined as a
person who has not committed acts that are a ground of inadmissi-
bility, with an exception for those with a single offense of possessing
less than thirty grams of marijuana.109 In addition, there is a
categorical bar on cancellation for those who have ever been
convicted of a crime that is the basis of inadmissibility.10 As a
result, cancellation is barred across the board for any conviction
Other Distortions in the Immigration Reform Debate, 44 BRANDEIs L.J. 637, 643 (2006).
104. See, e.g., Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 209 (2005).
105. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 621 (2006)
(labeling a portion of the bill the 'DREAM Act").
106. INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2007) (2000).
107. INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2000).
108. INA § 240A(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B) (2000).
109. INA § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(3) (2000).
110. INA § 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2000).
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related to drugs, and is barred for any admission of a drug violation
within the past ten years other than a one time possession of
marijuana, even though removal would cause "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" to a citizen or LPR family member.
Similar restrictions exist on a wide array of remedies for immi-
grants present in the United States who present a variety of
compelling equities, such as being a battered spouse"' or a person
taking temporary refuge due to flooding or other disaster in their
home country.1 2 In each of these situations, the inadmissibility
ground operates to trump the statutorily recognized category of
compelling equities.
Most surprisingly, inadmissibility grounds have crept into the law
so as to affect persons who are lawful permanent residents and have
therefore already been found to be admissible, and who may have
resided in the United States for years with full legal resident status.
First, criminal inadmissibility can be triggered by any trip in which
a lawful permanent resident crosses a border."' Thus, a lawful
permanent resident who is not deportable, for example, because the
person has never been convicted of a crime, could be "inadmissible"
following a trip outside the country due to past drug use. Indeed, at
the border, if the person is questioned about drug use that never
even led to an arrest, the answers to those questions could be used
to find the person to be an "arriving alien" who is "inadmissible.""'
The second change in the law that affects lawful permanent
residents has to do with the clock stop rule enacted in 1996. This
highly technical provision has far-reaching implications. Under both
new and old law, a lawful permanent resident who is deportable
must show seven years of continuous residence in order to obtain
relief from removal."" But the 1996 law created a stop clock
provision that stops the clock for continuous residence at the time
111. INA § 240A(b)(2)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000).
112. INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(A) (2000).
113. INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (2000).
114. See Morawetz, Invisible Border, supra note 43, at 205-10.
115. This requirement is currently found in INA § 240A(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). The
requirement under old law, which remains available to some of those with pre-1996 offenses,
was found in INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1995). See generally INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289
(2001) (finding that pre-1996 relief is available for a permanent resident who pled guilty prior
to the change in the law).
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a crime is committed if it is a ground of inadmissibility and triggers
removability." 6 For lawful permanent residents who do not travel,
the clock stop rule can only be triggered by a ground of deportability
that corresponds to an inadmissibility ground. But since those who
travel are subjected to inadmissibility criteria,"' it is sufficient that
they meet a ground of inadmissibility. As a result, as the law is
applied, a mere admission of occasional drug use within the first
seven years of arriving in the country can lead to both removal and
ineligibility for relief."' 8 And all of these consequences are triggered
by a finding that the individual fits within the scope of the drug
inadmissibility ground.
2. The Enforcement Context
The full effect of the inadmissibility ground depends, of course,
not on the law on the books, but also on how it is enforced. Unfortu-
nately, there are many signs that the drug inadmissibility ground
is being applied expansively and that the government has begun to
train officers to actively seek out admissions of past wrongdoing
that can then be used to exclude or deport the unwary.
Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe,"9 the case in which the Philippine na-
tional obtained a visa despite admissions of past drug use to a
medical officer, 2° illustrates how every visa seeker faces a risk of
being denied entry despite approval by the State Department
following a lengthy visa process. Pazcoguin was forthright and the
State Department saw no need to bar his entry.'2 ' But immigration
116. See INA § 240A(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d).
117. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
118. There are some issues still under litigation about the scope of this rule. See, e.g.,
Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006) (limiting the retroactive reach
of the clock stop rule); Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 397 (3d Cir. 2003) (considering the
argument that LPRs retain the ability to invoke the rule of Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449
(1963)). Nonetheless, the agency position is clear that any lawful permanent resident who
travels is subject to review for inadmissibility on criminal grounds, regardless of how long ago
the offense occurred or how insignificant the trip outside the country. See In re Collado-
Munoz, 21 I&N Dec. 1061, 1064 (BIA 1998).
119. 292 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2002).
120. Id. at 1212; see supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
121. Pazcoquin, 292 F.3d at 1212.
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officials retained the power to seek to exclude him at the border and
chose to exercise it.
122
There is reason to suspect that immigrants face even tougher
hurdles as government enforcement personnel at the border seek
to obtain admissions that are not in the file, as they were in
Pazcoguin. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, an
interagency law enforcement training organization for over eighty
federal agencies, 123 has developed specific training materials on
obtaining admissions from noncitizens that can be used to lodge
removal charges. 124 A training article posted as part of the agency's
website walks inspectors through the process of getting an immi-
grant to confess to past drug use.125 It urges immigration inspectors
to make greater use of their interrogation power to get admissions
that will stand up in court. 12 The article confidently describes how
inspectors can take advantage of the non-criminal nature of
immigration proceedings to extract incriminating statements. 27 The
article further notes that the immigrant will be placed in a catch-22
situation: either the immigrant cooperates and provides the
damning admission, or refuses to cooperate and can be excluded on
that basis. 128 There is nothing in the article that speaks to the
circumstances under which officers should adopt these tactics to
obtain admissions. Instead, the article unapologetically arms those
officers who choose to take such a tough approach with the tools to
obtain admissions that will later stand up in court as grounds of
inadmissibility.
A recent case out of the Third Circuit illustrates the use of these
interrogation techniques. In Romero-Fereyros v. Attorney General,
12
an immigrant with a past conviction applied to adjust his status
122. Id.
123. Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Welcome to the FLETC, http://www.
fletc.gov/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
124. See Keith Hunsucker, Criminal Without Conviction-Prosecuting the Unconvicted
Arriving Criminal Alien Under Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/legal-division/the-informer/research-by-
subjectlmiscellaneous/aliencriminalwithoutconviction.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 3.
127. Id. at 3-4.
128. Id.
129. No. 05-3925, 2997 WL 1031264 (3d Cir. Apr. 5, 2007).
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based on his marriage to an American citizen.' a Because of the past
conviction, which did not relate to drugs, he applied for a waiver of
inadmissibility.' While he was waiting for his lawyer to park her
car, he was called for his interview.'32 He explained that he would
like to wait for his lawyer, but was encouraged to go ahead without
her so as not to lose his appointment. 3 3 In the interview, he was
questioned about his past drug use and admitted to past use of
cocaine.' The agents immediately found that he was no longer
eligible for a waiver.'35 They proceeded to handcuff him and order
him summarily removed. 136 On appeal, the Third Circuit concluded
that there was no error. " The inflexibility of the drug inadmissibil-
ity ground served as a shield to the agents' actions.
The potential use of these interrogation methods to obtain
admissions of past drug use is especially troubling because immigra-
tion enforcement is already infused with problems of racial and
ethnic profiling. 3  The drug inadmissibility ground is akin to
driving over the speed limit-a violation that is so widespread
(especially when the scope of the arrest power extends far back in
time to reach lifetime violations) that the person with the arresting
power can select who to arrest out of an enormous population of
violators. In these situations, police can simply decide who to find
in violation of the law and there is a heightened risk of racial and
other improper forms of profiling. In the drug inadmissibility
context, the ability to interrogate people about conduct that is
widespread in the population means that virtually anyone can be
found inadmissible if the enforcement officers choose to subject that
person to interrogation about past drug use. If there is reason to
suspect that people will be targeted based on race, the underlying
130. Id. at *1.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *2.
137. Id. at *4.
138. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement: Drugs, Migrants, and the Rule of
Law, 47 VILL. L. REV. 897 (2002) [hereinafter Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement]; Kevin
Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675
(2000).
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broad grounds of inadmissibility serve simply as an excuse for
excluding persons based on profiling.
Indeed, unfair profiling in immigration enforcement is a particu-
lar danger today because the federal government has deputized
increasing numbers of local police officers to engage in immigration
enforcement,'39 and the agency's stated goal is to "remove all remov-
able aliens."14 As others have observed, delegation of immigration
enforcement to localities increases the risk of improper profiling in
immigrant communities.4 More immigrants, with or without legal
status, face serious consequences for admitting to conduct that is
not unusual and to which they might readily admit.
B. The Criminal Law Context
In addition to the effects of immigration law changes and
immigration enforcement, the impact of the drug inadmissibility
ground is governed by changes in both the legal structure of crim-
inal laws relating to drugs as well as drug enforcement practices.
The criminal law context is significant for two reasons. First, when
the immigration law cross-references the criminal law, as the drug
inadmissibility ground has since 1986,142 any reduction in the
requirements for a criminal violation immediately expands the
scope of the inadmissibility grounds. This is true whether or not the
individual is arrested and convicted. Second, actual enforcement of
the criminal law that leads to a record showing that the criminal
drug laws were violated will serve in the immigration system as
139. There has been a vast increase in agreements between state and local governments
and the federal government to engage in immigration enforcement. Editorial, Immigration
Outsourced, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2008, at A26. These agreements, under § 287(g) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, provide local officers with the right to enforce federal
immigration law. INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000).
140. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., BuREAu OF IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
ENDGAME: OFFICE OF DETENTION AND REMOVAL STRATEGIC PLAN, 2003-2012, ch. 4-1 (2003),
available at http://www.fas.orgtirp/agency/dhs/endgame.pdf ("Endgame sets in motion a
cohesive enforcement program to build the capacity to 'remove all removable aliens."'). When
it was first issued, ENDGAME was available through government websites.
141. See, e.g., Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation,
106 MICH. L. REv. 567, 634 (2008); Carrie L. Arnold, Note, Racial Profiling in Immigration
Enforcement: State and Local Agreements to Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L.
REV. 113, 119-21 (2007).
142. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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indisputable proof of the underlying violation of the law. Increased
resources for enforcement, or changes in the law or institutional
setting that make it easier to obtain a conviction will, therefore,
change the de facto scope of the inadmissibility ground.
1. State Criminal Law Requirements
The inadmissibility provisions apply to both foreign and domestic
violations of controlled substance laws.' Therefore, the sweep of
the ground depends on a wide array of legal systems and how they
regulate drugs. Equivalent conduct will be a ground of inadmissibil-
ity if committed in some jurisdictions and not if committed in
others. But interestingly, the law does not distinguish between how
seriously the jurisdiction chooses to treat the offense.' As a result,
a violation of a rule that the jurisdiction lightly enforces with a
minimal penalty will be treated as equivalent to a violation that the
jurisdiction treats with a heavy penalty. But if there is no regulation
and no penalty, then the conduct is lawful and not a ground of
inadmissibility.'45 As a result, there is a sharp discontinuity in how
a jurisdiction's treatment of drug use translates into drug inadmissi-
bility.
There is some room, however, for how the definitions of crimes
within a jurisdiction (short of legalization) will affect drug inadmis-
sibility. Laws that simplify the elements required to prove a
violation will make it easier to establish that an individual has
committed acts that "constitute the essential elements" '146 of a
violation of drug laws. In the United States, at least, it appears that
this is precisely what the criminal law has done.
Markus Dubber's study, Victims in the War on Crime,'47 traces the
myriad ways in which criminal law has developed to make it
143. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(1I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I1) (2000) (stating that
inadmissibility will result from "a violation of ... any law or regulation of a state, the United
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance") (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. The inadmissibility laws provide separate exclusion grounds for drug addiction and
trafficking. See supra note 28. These grounds do not depend on the criminal law of other
countries.
146. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(1) (2000).
147. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USES AND ABUSES OF
VICTIMS' RIGHTS (2002).
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simpler to establish a violation of the drug laws. In particular,
states have expanded the crime of possession so that it reaches a
wide range of circumstances in which the accused may have had no
knowledge of the item purportedly possessed. 4 ' In New York, for
example, "from evidence of your being in a car or a room with a
controlled substance, the prosecutor, without additional evidence,
gets to jump to the conclusion that you possessed the drugs, and
[that you] knew that you did."'49 As a result, a single drug item
found in a car will be treated as "possessed" by every person in the
car, and all the occupants are subject to prosecution. 5 °
Those accused of drug possession also have few available
defenses. They cannot take advantage of distinctions between
principals and accomplices.' 5 ' "Whereas the law of complicity has
long been careful to remind itself that mere presence does not an
accomplice make, the law of possession has had no difficulty
imposing liability on that very basis."'52 Moreover, possession
offenses, on their face, are not based on the status of the accused,
even if in practice they are applied based on suspect criteria. 53 As
a result, they cannot be challenged on the vagueness grounds that
curtailed vagrancy statutes.
5 4
Controlled substance laws have also been expanded to cover
matters that are relatively innocuous. Possession of a controlled
substance without a prescription is defined as a crime, even if it
involves something as innocuous as having possession of a family
member's prescription pain killers or sleep medication that the
individual was not using in an abusive way.'55 As in other areas,
laws are changed to make prosecutions easier. But because the
inadmissibility law looks solely at the law on the books, it fails to
148. Id. at 37 (describing presumptions on possession as a popular legislative choice); id.
at 35 (describing state statutes that do not require proof that the individual knew he or she
was "possessing anything at all").
149. Id. at 37.
150. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.25 (Consol. 2000).
151. DUBBER, supra note 147, at 38.
152. Id. at 65; see also id. at 35 (describing how possessory offenses do not lend themselves
to defenses of necessity or self-defense).
153. Id. at 80-81.
154. Id.
155. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-42-5 (2007).
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recognize that prosecutors may have no interest or inclination to
apply the laws so broadly.
2. State Criminal Law Enforcement
Unlike the laws on the books, which can be equally problematic
for an immigrant whether they carry light or heavy penalties,
criminal law enforcement is critically important because any
conviction will be treated as indisputable proof of a violation of a
controlled substance law. 5 ' The immigration system will not look
behind the fact of the conviction, no matter how problematic the
procedures that led to the conviction.
There can be no doubt that domestic criminal law enforcement
policies have vastly expanded the number of people who have
records of drug convictions. As Frank Zimring and Bernard
Harcourt have observed, the recent history of drug control in the
United States "represents a singular chapter in the history of
criminal justice.' 157 Between 1980 and 2000, a time when non-drug
prisoners in state facilities tripled, the number of persons impris-
oned for drug crimes grew twelve-fold.'58 In federal prisons, the
disparity was even greater. As Zimring and Harcourt note, "none of
the hydraulic processes that ... make the bark of the criminal law
louder than its bite" were at work during this period of the drug
war. 1
59
In addition to the increased growth in the number of people
imprisoned for drug violations, 6 ° a far greater number have been
immersed in the criminal justice system for low-level drug offenses.
Between 1990 and 2002, marijuana arrests increased nationally by
113 percent.161 In some localities, the expansion was even more dra-
matic. In New York City, for example, marijuana arrests increased
156. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (stating that "any alien
convicted of... a violation" of drug laws will be inadmissible).
157. FRANKLIN ZIMRING & BERNARD HARCOURT, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE REGULATION OF
VICE 217 (2007).
158. Id. at 219.
159. Id. at 219-20.
160. Id. at 218-19.
161. Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, The War on Marijuana: The Transformation of the War
on Drugs in the 1990s, 3 HARM REDUCTION J. 1, 3 (2006), available at http://www.
harmreductionjournal.com/content/pdf/1477-7517-3-6.pdf.
[Vol. 50:163
RETHINKING DRUG INADMISSIBILITY
by 882 percent over the same period.'62 In New York City, the most
common arrest was for marijuana in the public view.'63 Although
the overwhelming majority of these cases were dismissed, 20
percent of cases led to a sentence of time served, a fine, or jail.'
Given the sheer volume of marijuana arrests, this remains a high
number of criminal court dispositions finding violations of controlled
substance laws.
For those who are arrested, changes in criminal procedure law
have made it more difficult to defend against charges that prosecu-
tors choose to press. As Dubber describes, criminal procedure law
has evolved in ways that make it easy for police to justify an arrest
for drug possession. 6 ' Any bulge on a person can trigger a stop by
the police that triggers a frisk and then allows for an arrest when
drugs are found.'66 Similarly, a minor traffic violation can trigger a
stop that triggers a search that can lead to a drug possession
arrest.'67 As Dubber argues, drug possession laws provide police
with enormous power to arrest whomever they choose to ar-
rest-they are the modern day equivalent of discredited vagrancy
laws. 6 '
In addition to increased enforcement, there is evidence that this
enforcement has had a disproportionate impact on Black and Latino
communities. Blacks and Latinos were both more likely to be
arrested for marijuana in public view and more likely to be detained
prior to arraignment.'69 Those detained, of course, have more of an
162. Id. at 8.
163. See Andrew Golub, Bruce D. Johnson & Eloise Dunlap, The Race/Ethnic Disparity in
Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 131, 132-33
(2007).
164. Id. at 150 tbl.3 (reporting that 9.1 percent of defendants were sentenced to time
served, 8.0 percent to a fine, and 3.2 percent to jail).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
166. See, e.g, United States v. Proctor, 148 F.3d 39, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that
seizure of marijuana and arrest of suspect was reasonable after officer observed bulge in
suspect's jacket and performed pat-down search).
167. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808-09, 818 (1996) (holding
constitutional a pretextual traffic stop for failure to signal that led to a subsequent search for
drugs and suspect arrests).
168. DUBBER, supra note 147, at 47-70 (describing how possession laws have furthered the
rapid expansion of arbitrary police power).
169. See Golub et al., supra note 163, at 155 (finding that focus on marijuana arrests has
had a "substantial and disproportionate impact on Black and Hispanic communities").
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incentive to take a sentence of time served, since they have already
served the time. The time-served sentence, however, has vastly
different immigration consequences than a dismissal because it
involves an adverse criminal disposition.
Even though available data suggests that immigrants are less
likely to be incarcerated than are native-born Americans,"' ° it is
probably fair to assume that arrest and conviction patterns for
noncitizens will rise and fall with overall criminal enforcement
policies. Thus changes in domestic criminal law, policies, and
enforcement will be reflected in the numbers of noncitizens who will
be inadmissible due to the drug inadmissibility grounds. Altogether,
the changes in this criminal justice context over the past twenty
years mean that the drug inadmissibility grounds will be easier to
prove in a greater number of cases for noncitizens who have lived in
the United States in some capacity prior to applying for lawful
permanent resident status.
Ironically, more lenient policies used in some jurisdictions may
also contribute to making noncitizens inadmissible. In a jurisdiction
that treats a possession offense as something very minor, warrant-
ing treatment equivalent to a traffic ticket,17"' a person may not take
the violation very seriously or bother to contest an erroneous
citation. Nonetheless, a criminal disposition could serve to preclude
admission because it will establish a violation of a law or regulation
of a state or another country. For those who face lax enforcement
policies in another country, it may be more likely that there will be
no criminal disposition. For this group, the most problematic aspect
of the current immigration law may be the use of admissions of
violations. The more unenforced a provision of law, the more likely
that the individual will not worry about revealing a past violation.
III. THE CASE FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The law on drug inadmissibility is ripe for review. It has largely
evolved without thought to its contours and, if fully enforced, would
170. See RUB9N G. RUMBAUT &WALTERA. EWING, IMMIGRATION POLCY CENTER, THE MYTH
OF IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION (2007).
171. See, e.g., King & Mauer, supra note 161, at 9-10 (describing policies of the Toronto
Police Chief and the Ontario provincial police organization).
[Vol. 50:163
RETHINKING DRUG INADMISSIBILITY
lead to such sweeping consequences that it would trump many other
policies embedded in immigration law. As we enter an era of greater
enforcement of the fine print of immigration law, it is important to
ensure that the fine print makes sense. In the case of drug inadmis-
sibility, the law cannot meet that basic test.
Drug inadmissibility rules should be changed because they are
counterproductive, allow for arbitrary enforcement of the law, and
are totally out of proportion to legitimate interests. The rules are
inconsistent with domestic values and standards as reflected in
employment practices, military recruitment policies, and other
areas of domestic law that permit judgments based on past drug use
or convictions. These policies have evolved to reflect the reality of
domestic use and attitudes, particularly with respect to remote
offenses. Furthermore, drug inadmissibility rules should be changed
because they undermine the more fundamental interest of the
immigration system in encouraging truthful responses to questions.
A system that seeks information and then offers no flexibility for
dealing with likely answers encourages a lack of candor that
undermines the integrity of the immigration system.
A. Measuring the Immigration Standards Against Popular
Experience
Drug inadmissibility policy sets out three basic rules: (1) admis-
sion of any form of violation of drug laws serves as a ground of
inadmissibility, regardless of how minor or how remote in time; 72
(2) the only waiver is for a single offense involving simple possession
of a small quantity of marijuana and that waiver requires that the
offense be fifteen years in the past or that denial of admission would
work an extreme hardship on a citizen or LPR parent, spouse, or
child;'73 and (3) that regardless of the circumstances or the reasons
for a plea, any conviction record for violation of a drug law is
irrebuttable proof of that violation.'74 With these standards, most
adult Americans would be ineligible to immigrate.
172. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(I) (2000).
173. INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2000).
174. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 82(a)(2)(A)(I) (2000).
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The federal government and various academic institutions have
tracked drug use for decades. These studies, although sometimes
criticized for relying too much on self-reporting and therefore
potentially underestimating drug use, 175 paint a portrait of a
country in which some experience with illegal drugs is the norm
rather than the exception. For adults with a high school education
who have reached age forty-five, the statistics show that 79 percent
had tried marijuana by the time they turned forty-five and 72
percent had tried an illicit drug other than marijuana.'76 Almost
nine out of ten had tried either marijuana or another drug. 7 7 Thus,
even assuming that all of those who reported marijuana use could
squeeze into the narrow waiver in the immigration law for one time
possession of a small amount of marijuana, it would still be the case
that more than seven out of ten forty-five-year-olds would be
inadmissible and would not even meet the test of a hardship waiver
(which is limited to a single possession of a small quantity of
marijuana) 17 under existing law.
The statistics also show that lifetime use among forty-five-year-
olds, who by definition have had a longer life in which to accrue a
transgression of the drug laws, is not an aberration. Almost half of
all twelfth grade high school students admit to some illicit drug use
during their lifetime. 79 Over one quarter admit to use of a drug
other than marijuana.8 ° In addition, the majority of high school
seniors report having friends who use illicit drugs.' 8' Even if they
have not themselves used drugs, simply being in a car or room
with these friends would be sufficient under many jurisdictions to
175. See Thomas M. Mieczkowski, The Prevalence of Drug Use in the United States, 20
CRIME &JUST. 349,361,388-89 (1996) (noting that the MONITORING THE FUTURE study of high
school graduates, see infra note 176, omits drop-outs who are expected to have higher use and
that it relies on self-reporting).
176. NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., 2 MONITORING THE
FUTURE: NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975-2004: COLLEGE STUDENTS AND
ADULTS AGES 19-45, at 30, 77-83 (2005), available at http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/
pubs/monographs/vol2_2004.pdf.
177. Id.
178. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
179. NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., MONITORING THE
FUTURE: NATIONAL RESULTS ON ADOLESCENT DRUG USE: OVERVIEW OF KEY FINDINGS, 2006,
at 47 (2006), available at www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/monographs/overview2005.pdf.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 208.
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establish a criminal offense.' For those who are twenty-nine to
thirty years old, lifetime use reaches 60 percent for marijuana and
46 percent for any illicit drug other than marijuana.'83 Annual rates
of drug use (namely use within the previous year) run at 34-40
percent for those who are one to four years out of high school."
Thus, as compared to domestic statistics, the drug inadmissibility
rules are extraordinarily harsh. If applied fully, they would serve to
screen out the majority of the native-born population, overshadow-
ing all other policies underlying the immigration system.
Of course, domestic statistics do not speak directly to the pop-
ulation immigrating from abroad. It is difficult to get comparable
lifetime data for many other countries.'85 Where these statistics are
available, the numbers also show widespread lifetime use. In
Canada, 45 percent of adults report lifetime use of marijuana, with
the lifetime figures being higher for younger cohorts than for older
cohorts." 6 The percentage of those who report an experience with
drugs other than marijuana is lower than in the United States, but
still reaches 30 percent for some cohorts.'87 Similarly, studies in the
United Kingdom show an overall rate of 34 percent lifetime usage
for the adults surveyed, with rates for younger cohorts reaching as
high as 58 percent.' Data from Australia indicates an overall
182. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
183. NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., 2 MONITORING THE
FUTURE: NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975-2006: COLLEGE STUDENTS AND
ADULTS AGES 19-45, at 76 (2007), available at www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/mono
graphs/vol2_2006.pdf
184. Id. at 235.
185. For those countries where statistics are available, it is not clear that they are
comparable to the U.S. statistics. Lifetime use in the MONITORING THE FUTURE study is
evaluated based on both current survey statements and statements in past surveys. Id. at 74-
75. For many countries, there are no available lifetime statistics, apparently because the data
is not seen as very helpful. For example, a United Nations-sponsored global study of drug
issues provides information on annual use, but not lifetime use. The study states that lifetime
data "are not very illustrative." U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG
TRENDS 2003, at 347 (2003), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/trends2003_wwwE.pdf.
It explains that "[t]he fact that a 50-year-old person smoked marijuana at the age of 20 does
not provide much insight into the current drug abuse problem." Id.
186. CANADIAN CTR. ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE, CANADIAN ADDICTION SURVEY 48 (2005),
available at http://www.ccsa.ca./2005%20CCSA%2ODocuments/ccsa-004804-2005.pdf.
187. Id. at 55.
188. HOME OFFICE RESEARCH, DEV. & STATISTICS DIR., DRUG MISUSE DECLARED IN 2000:
RESULTS FROM THE BRITISH CRIME SURVEY, vi, 12 (2001), available at http://www.homeoffice.
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lifetime experience rate of 38 percent, with some age cohorts
reaching 58 percent, and even higher figures for male cohorts." 9 In
France, available data indicates lower levels of lifetime use which
is reported at about 26 percent. 190 Although the details of this data
vary from country to country, the overall available evidence
suggests that some experience with illicit drugs is sufficiently
widespread that a screening criterion based on any past use is
bound to reach broadly.
The high likelihood of some experience with drugs means that the
drug inadmissibility ground, if fully applied, threatens to deny
admission to large numbers of persons who might otherwise meet
the standards for immigration, including the spouses of U.S. citizens
and prized future employees.
B. Comparable Zero-Tolerance Policies Have Proven To Be
Unworkable and Unjustified
Employment law and practice serve as a useful laboratory for
examining the consequences of the kind of zero-tolerance policy
embodied in the immigration laws. In the employment context, both
law and practice have sought to find an appropriate balance
between avoiding the risks of admitting those whose past behavior
threatens to affect their future performance, and avoiding a screen
that eliminates candidates from consideration arbitrarily or in
contravention of the employer's interest in attracting the best talent
for the job. In this setting, law and practice have rejected the kinds
of rules that are found in the immigration system. Even the FBI, an
employer that can be expected to have extremely high standards,
has rejected a zero-tolerance, or multiple-transgressions tolerance,
model for fear of losing valuable prospective employees.' 9 '
gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hors224.pdf.
189. See Australian Inst. of Criminology, Illicit Drugs and Alcohol: Lifetime Use of Any
Illicit Drug, Australia, 2004, http://www.aic.gov.au/stats/crime/drugs/lifeuse/anydrug-
2004.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
190. European Monitoring Ctr. for Drugs & Drug Addiction, Profile for France,
http://profiles.emcdda.europa.eu/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.Content&nnodeid=l9694&sL
anguageiso=EN (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
191. Kevin Johnson, FBI Drug Standard Lowered for Hiring, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2007,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-08-01-fbiN.htm.
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In the employment setting, as with immigration, any bar to
employment operates like a bar to admission-it serves to exclude
an otherwise eligible person from being hired for a job. Those who
are screened out for a job, like those who are screened out for
immigration, have passed all of the standard screens. In the job
context, the individual will have passed a written test or obtained
the necessary credentials for a job. The individual might have been
interviewed and found to be the best candidate; however, due to the
employer's screening criteria, the individual cannot be hired.
Similarly, with inadmissibility, the individual will be among those
who meet the criteria for admission. He or she, for example, may be
married to an American citizen and have children who are U.S.
citizens; or the individual may have been hired by a university as an
outstanding scholar and may be seeking permanent status. Just as
an employer faces costs in adopting an employment test that could
screen out the best candidates for a job, the immigration system
faces the cost of screening out parents, employees, spouses, and
others who otherwise further the nation's immigration goals.
The experience of employers who are permitted to discriminate on
the basis of past drug use points strongly in favor of reforming the
drug inadmissibility ground. In the employment context, certain
employers are expressly permitted to discriminate among job
applicants on the grounds of past drug use.192 Chief among these
192. Federal employers are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 290dd(b). This provision permits
screening of employees based on past drug use for selected agencies and positions. The statute
provides:
(b) Deprivation of employment.
(1) Prohibition. No person may be denied or deprived of Federal civilian
employment or a Federal professional or other license or right solely on
the grounds of prior substance abuse.
(2) Application. This subsection shall not apply to employment in-
(A) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(C) the National Security Agency;
(D) any other department or agency of the Federal Government
designated for purposes of national security by the President;
or
(E) in any position in any department or agency of the Federal
Government, not referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (D),
which position is determined pursuant to regulations prescribed
by the head of such agency or department to be a sensitive
position.
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employers is the FBI. Pursuant to federal statute, the FBI is
permitted to deny employment based on past drug use.193 The
agency's experience, however, has led it to reject past drug use as a
disqualifying criterion for hiring agents. 94 The ban simply did not
work and proved to be counterproductive.'95
The FBI initially adopted an all-out ban on hiring those with any
past drug use, other than "experimental use" of marijuana.'96 In
1994, it changed its policy to relax the ban on past drug use.19v It
adopted a set of rules relating to the amount, recency, and type of
use of any controlled substance.19 These rules essentially allowed
for experimental use of a range of drugs, with the test for experi-
mental use set by a rule as to the number of times that the person
had, for example, used marijuana.199 To discourage applicants who
would fail the drug screen, the FBI cautioned potential applicants
not to apply for a position if they would not be able to provide the
necessary answers to drug questions." ° The questions were based
on numerical thresholds of drug use. 0' For example, one question
was whether an applicant had used marijuana more than fifteen
times in his or her life. 02 Another was whether the applicant had
used an illegal drug other than marijuana more than five times.20 3
The 1994 change in the rules was accompanied by the adoption of
polygraph tests for all new agents.20 4
42 U.S.C. § 290dd(b) (2000).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd(b)(2)(B).
194. FBI to Ask About Use of Drugs in Polygraphs for Applicants, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL,
Mar. 8, 1994, at 5A.
195. See Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement, supra note 138, at 897.
196. It is unclear when this policy was adopted. Changes in the policy announced in 1994
make clear that there was an earlier policy. The author filed a Freedom of Information
Request to obtain this information, but has not received any documents that show when the
policy was first instituted.
197. FBI Expands Polygraph Use, 210 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 44 (1994).
198. FBI Employment Policies and Practices, http://www.fbi.gov/employment/policies.htm
(last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. The post-December 2006 policy can be found at http://www.fbijobs.gov/52.asp (last
visited Sept. 25, 2008).
204. FBI Expands Polygraph Use, supra note 197; FBI To Ask About Use of Drugs in
Polygraphs for Applicants, supra note 194, at 5A.
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In announcing the 1994 changes, FBI director Freeh cited his
experience in trying to recruit people to work at the FBI after he
became director.20 5 He suggested that the FBI's pre-1994 ban, which
barred candidates with any past use other than experimental use of
marijuana, was overly rigid and did not provide necessary flexibil-
ity.2"6 From his experience in other parts of the Justice Department,
he was familiar with situations in which a more flexible test allowed
for the selection of better job candidates.0 7
Even the policy adopted by the FBI in 1994, however, also proved
to be too rigid. On December 21, 2006, the FBI abandoned the
numerical tests.20 8 FBI Director Mueller offered a cryptic explana-
tion:
After a thorough review, the policy was modified to eliminate
certain specific numeric thresholds as the sole determinant of
suitability for employment in the FBI. Consistent with the
approach taken by other Intelligence Community agencies, in
making the determination about an applicant's suitability for
FBI employment, all relevant facts, including the recency and
frequency of use, now will be evaluated. Otherwise the pre-
employment drug policy is unchanged. °9
A spokesman for the FBI later explained that the department found
it difficult to draw a distinction between those who met the
numerical requirements and those who did not.210 Director Mueller
explained:
We have found the numeric thresholds to be arbitrary, not
necessarily the key determinant of suitability for FBI employ-
ment. Too often, the focus of the inquiry into an applicant's
background has centered on the number of incidents of usage, as
205. See id. (discussing Goth polygraphs for applicants).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. FBI Headline Archives, FBI Modifies Pre-Employment Drug Use Policy, Dec. 21, 2006,
available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/decO6/employ-policy.htm.
209. Id.; Memorandum from Robert S. Mueller, Director of the FBI, to FBI-HQ and FO
Pocs (Dec. 21, 2006) (on fie with author).
210. Dan Eggen, FBIBows to Modern Realities, Eases Rules on Past Drug Use, WASH. POST,
Aug. 7, 2007, at A3.
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opposed to the recency, context as well as frequency of prior
usage.2 n
Thus, despite statutory authority to ban employment of those with
past drug use, and despite the sensitive nature of positions with the
FBI, the FBI found that it simply did not work to bar employment
of those who had used drugs in the past. In the end, it adopted a
policy that does not include rigid one-time-use rules and that
accepts former drug use, including past use of drugs other than
marijuana. Under the current standard, a potential applicant is
asked to self-screen by answering the following questions:
" Have you used marijuana at all within the last three years?
" Have you used any other illegal drug (including anabolic
steroids after February 27, 1991) at all in the past 10 years?
" Have you ever sold any illegal drug for profit?
" Have you ever used an illegal drug (no matter how many times
or how long ago) while in a law enforcement or prosecutorial
position, or in a position which carries with it a high level of
responsibility or public trust?
212
The FBI is not alone. The same questions are asked of applicants
to work at the National Drug Intelligence Center, 13 and for
internships with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service.214 Some
federal agencies have more lax requirements. The CIA, for example,
states on its website that applicants should generally not have used
any illegal drugs within the previous twelve months and that prior
drug use will be carefully evaluated.21 5
211. Memorandum from Robert S. Mueller, supra note 209.
212. Federal Bureau of Investigations, Background Investigation, Employment Drug
Policy, supra note 6.
213. National Drug Intelligence Center, NDIC Employment Drug Policy, http://www.usdoj.
gov/ndicjobs/drugpol.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
214. United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Internships at NCIS,
http://www.ncis.navy.mil/join/internships.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
215. Central Intelligence Agency, Careers at CIA, https://www.cia.gov/careersfaq/
index.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2008); see also 41 U.S.C. 701(a)(2) (2000) ("No Federal agency
shall enter into a contract with an individual unless such individual agrees that the individual
will not engage in the unlawful manufacture, distribution, dispensation, possession, or use
of a controlled substance in the performance of the contract.").
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The same trend can be seen with state "public safety" em-
ployers.216 Police departments across the country have relaxed their
bars to hiring officers with past drug use. A recent study of criteria
used by police departments found that, although there was an
increase in drug testing of recruits, there was a "significant de-
crease" in the number of departments that require a clean criminal
record for those seeking employment.217 The report noted a "growing
tendency" to tolerate some history of drug use.218 These local policies
often provide greater flexibility in terms of the range of past drugs
used and the time frame in which they might have been used.21 9
The policies of these federal and local entities reflect the reality
of past drug use throughout the population, and a judgment that
past use is not a good measure of who will be a good employee.
Given the high level of experience with drugs, employers have
learned that they are simply cutting themselves off from many
strong potential candidates if they adopt crude zero-tolerance tests
216. The Americans with Disability Act (ADA) restricts the degree to which employers may
ask questions that will elicit information about a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2000). There
is some dispute about the degree to which this also restricts employers' ability to inquire into
past drug use because an inquiry into use could lead to information related to the disability
of past addiction. Compare U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Notice No.
915.002, Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related Questions and Medical
Examinations (Oct. 10, 1995) (stating that an employer may ask a question about past illegal
drug use provided that the particular question is not "likely to elicit information about a
disability"), with U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Notice No. 915.002,
Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (July 27, 2000) (avoiding giving a specific answer on whether
an inquiry into past use is permissible). Despite these issues, public safety employers have
historically felt free to ask questions about past use. Matthew Antinossi, Respect for the Law
Is No Excuse: Drug Addiction History & Public Safety Officer Qualifications...Are Public
Employers Breaking the Law?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 711 (1999) (setting forth drug history criteria
used by various state and local departments and arguing that these policies violate the ADA).
217. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 6.
218. Id. at 12.
219. See, e.g., Butte County Sherriff's Office Pre-Employment Policy Regarding Illegal
Use/Possession of Drugs, http://www.buttecounty.net/sheriffs/pdfs/drug%/20policy3-1 1.pdf (last
visited Sept. 25, 2008) (barring those who have used some drugs, but allowing for recruits
who, inter alia, had not used cocaine, unauthorized prescription drugs, or steroids in the
previous three years). In New York City, certain past convictions will bar employment,
but there is no across-the-board publicly stated disqualifier based on past drug use. See
NYPD Exam and Employment Requirements, http://www.nypdrecruit.com/NYPDExamand
EmploymentRequirements.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2008). In Los Angeles, the police
department allows some past use of drugs other than marijuana. Kerry Cavanaugh, A Little
Past Coke Use OK, Says LAPD Hiring Policy, L.A. DAILY NEws, Nov. 2, 2006, at N3.
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for past drug use. Immigration law rules on drug use, which are
even more extreme than the ones the FBI recently abandoned, have
the same problem of overbreadth that has proven unworkable in the
employment context.
C. Disproportionality
Extreme bars to admission based on past drug use are also vastly
disproportionate to the multiple interests of the immigration
system. Inadmissibility bars that cannot be waived act as complete
bars to the admission of any person, no matter how strong the
family relationship, how valuable the future employee, or how
important any other national interest.
The immigration system is largely built around identified do-
mestic interests. These include the interests of those who are here
to bring their family members into the United States or to obtain
permanent status, and the interest of employers in obtaining
workers to meet domestic employer needs.22 When a person who
otherwise meets immigration criteria is barred from admission, it
has direct costs, not only to the immigrant, but also to the domestic
interest that supported the underlying immigrant petition.
The harm to Americans when the fine print of these laws is fully
applied is palpable. Families are split apart, scientists cannot be
hired, artists are denied entry, and so forth. Some of these conse-
quences directly implicate international norms against the arbitrary
separation of families.2"' Others speak to the sheer irrationality of
the current rules. If, for example, a scientist would be a great
addition to the scientific community in the United States, does it
make any sense to deny admission based on the fact that this person
once tried cocaine at a party? Or used speed while staying up all
night to write a paper in college? Or used marijuana on a regular
basis twenty years ago?
220. H.R. REP. No. 91-851, at 2751-52, 2760 (1970).
221. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FORCED APART: FAMILIES SEPARATED AND IMMIGRANTS
HARMED BY UNITED STATES DEPORTATION POLICY 57-69 (2007), available at http://hrw.org
reports/2007/usO7O7/usO7O7webwcover.pdf; Morawetz, Invisible Border, supra note 43, at 57-
69.
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D. The Dangers of Arbitrary Enforcement and Profiling
Rules that are enforced erratically, but would apply to many if
enforced uniformly, present additional dangers. As with vagrancy
laws, they leave it to the enforcer to decide what law will be
applied.222 In the context of drug inadmissibility, the admission-
based ground leaves it to the interviewer to decide just how far to
probe and just how much to pursue independent evidence.223 Only
those who are interrogated face exclusion on the ground of an
admission. Those who are not asked are not excluded.
Arbitrary enforcement is a particular concern with immigration
law because of the stakes involved, including the interests of family
members in living together and the interest of employers in bringing
in talented employees.224 In light of these interests, a drug inadmis-
sibility ground that depends on the questions an immigration officer
chooses to ask is highly problematic. The officer essentially gets to
take the law into his or her own hands by deciding to ask questions
that will dictate admission decisions based on any prejudice or
preconception.225 Such arbitrariness is itself harmful both to the
individuals involved and to the integrity of the immigration system.
A screen based on a past conviction presents less of a danger of
arbitrariness by immigration officers. But it solidifies any arbitrari-
ness in criminal law enforcement as immigration policy. In the drug
area, it is well documented that the criminal law is enforced in a
disparate manner, meaning that persons of color are more likely to
have the conviction records that will be treated as absolute bars to
obtaining permanent legal status.226
E. Penalizing Honesty
The drug inadmissibility rules also threaten a more general
governmental interest in encouraging candor in the immigration
process. Those who honestly admit to past drug use when they are
questioned are barred from admission. In contrast, those who deny
222. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
223. See Hunsucker, supra note 124.
224. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Golub et al., supra note 163, at 131.
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past use (and can do so credibly because of the lack of any arrest or
conviction) are able to keep their record clear of any proof of past
use and may therefore be admitted. The message is clear: do not
admit to that which cannot be proven. This message undermines the
overall integrity of the immigration system.
The immigration system, like the tax system, depends on
information that is provided by the many people who file applica-
tions with the government. Encouraging honest information is
essential to the working of the system. But honest information
depends on some fair treatment of the information that is provided.
By treating any information of past drug use as a bar to immigra-
tion, the system discourages candor.
Penalties for honesty also place immigration inspectors in a
difficult situation. Even if the inspector is not inclined to engage in
interrogation techniques that will extract admissions and adopts a
"don't-ask-don't-tell" policy on past casual drug use, the inspector
will be hard pressed to ignore information that is volunteered. The
inspector might be particularly sympathetic to an individual who is
completely candid, but that very candor might leave the inspector
feeling bound by the system's inflexible rules.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Legislative reform of the drug inadmissibility ground could begin
by undoing some of the aspects of the current scheme which were
adopted without careful review or analysis. These changes could be
made through very minor and seemingly technical alterations to the
INA. Alternatively, Congress could recognize that the entire system
for screening out potential immigrants has become hostage to the
inevitable politics of immigration and crime, and that it can only be
properly fixed through depoliticization of the rule-making process.
A. Technical Fixes
Three technical alterations to the immigration law would go a
long way towards restoring rationality and proportionality to the
criteria for determining admissibility. These are: (1) abandonment
of the use of conduct, as opposed to a conviction, to determine
admissibility; (2) inclusion of an exception for petty offenses; and (3)
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removal of the bar to waivers for drug-related offenses. Together,
these changes would reduce arbitrary enforcement of the immigra-
tion laws and preserve the flexibility to admit worthy immigrants.
1. Basing Inadmissibility on Convictions
The first technical change is to delete the words "or who admits
having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute
the essential elements of" from the text of § 212(a)(2)(A)(i) of the
INA as it applies to persons with drug offenses.227 This phrase
serves little legitimate function in current immigration law and
opens the door to arbitrary enforcement through the selective
questioning of immigrants.
Ever since the 1950s, the immigration law has limited the
potentially sweeping power of immigration inspectors to bar
admission through their interrogation of persons seeking entry into
the country. Though the "admits having committed" language had
essentially become obsolete by 1990, this provision still has
significant force with respect to drugs. It allows for immigration
officials to select who to exclude simply by deciding when to ask
questions. Furthermore, it is completely out of keeping with public
values as reflected in the widespread evidence of use and attitudes
towards past use.22 It depends on answers to questions and
penalizes those who answer honestly.
Other admissibility provisions are also in place to deal with those
who are thought to be engaged in trafficking and those who are
thought to be addicts or current abusers. The health related grounds
of inadmissibility bar those who are drug addicts or drug abusers.229
Other criminal inadmissibility grounds extend to situations in
which the border official has reason to believe that the individual is
227. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2000). This could be achieved by
breaking 212(a)(2)(A)(i) at the point where it says "any alien" and placing the requirements
with respect to a conviction or an admission in the subsections (I) and (II). Alternatively, the
admission ground could be eliminated for both controlled substance and CIMT offenses.
Although many of the arguments in this Article would apply as well to CIMTs, there are
distinctions between the provisions, and this Article has not sought to explore fully the merits
of eliminating the inadmissibility ground based on admitting the elements of a CIMT.
228. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
229. INA § 212(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(i) (2000).
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engaged in trafficking. 23° Therefore, unless there is truly a national
interest in excluding persons with past use, there exists no inde-
pendent value in a provision that targets admission of the elements
of a controlled substance offense.
2. Inclusion of a Petty Offense Exception
The second technical fix is to extend the petty offense exception
that is available for all other convictions to the inadmissibility
rule based on a drug conviction. The petty offense exception is a
narrowly designed aspect of the immigration law that recognizes the
need to treat one-time offenders differently.23 ' It serves to ignore a
single youthful offense or a single adult offense that was punished
leniently by the relevant state or foreign authority.3 2
There is no rational reason to have a petty offense exception for
all crimes other than drug offenses. Indeed, given the large number
of minor drug arrests and convictions, it would seem that if a
particular set of crimes warranted a petty offense exception, the
exception would be most appropriately provided for drug offenses.
The petty offense exception also serves the important role of
providing a safety valve for cases in which the individual will not
have the necessary relationships to be eligible for a waiver under
212(h). For some categories of immigrants, such as those who are
brought in on an employment basis, there may be no pre-existing
relationship that can serve as the basis of a 212(h) waiver. Absent
a petty offense exception, these individuals are barred from
admission even when the offense is minor, thereby undermining
overall interests in immigration for that category of immigrant.
3. Eliminating Bars to 212(h) Waivers
The third technical change is to eliminate the bars to 212(h) relief
for those with a drug offense other than a single possession of under
thirty grams of marijuana. The 212(h) waiver generally serves as a
safety valve for considering whether to waive inadmissibility on
230. INA § 212(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) (2000).
231. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(ii) (2000).
232. Id.
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criminal grounds. It allows for a balancing of all of the facts and an
evaluation of the kinds of facts that might be considered by an
employer-such as the nature, recency, and severity of the past
offense.233 In light of the wide variety of criminal laws, as well as the
wide variety of offenses and the circumstances of these offenses,
212(h) is not generally subject to per se bars. Only drug crimes are
singled out for exclusion from this form of relief.234
There is no rational reason to single out drug crimes for such a
limitation. As the legislative history shows, the one-time minor
marijuana offense provision was simply introduced on the floor of
the Senate;235 it was not the product of any careful consideration of
different offenses and what they indicated about the desirability of
different groups of immigrants.
Furthermore, 212(h) recognizes the serious family interests at
stake that might warrant a waiver. On its own terms, 212(h) looks
to extreme hardship of the parent, spouse, or child of a lawful
permanent resident or U.S. citizen. 2" A bar to relief therefore
operates as a requirement that such extreme hardship be ignored,
and the question becomes which transgressions warrant ignoring
the extreme family hardship. It is hard to fathom that a greater
possession offense or a one-time offense involving a drug other than
marijuana should be an automatic bar to relief when the law
permits accommodation of those with other kinds of offenses.
B. Systematic Overhaul
A more ambitious congressional agenda would call for an
overhaul of the criminal grounds that bar admission. Such an
overhaul could seek to identify those offenses that are truly
problematic and to fashion waivers that can accommodate the
multiple interests in protecting against those who might be at
serious risk of committing a crime after their admission, and the
interests of families and employers in not barring immigrants
arbitrarily. But if recent experience is any guide, Congress cannot
be trusted to approach this task with adequate consideration of the
233. Id. § 212(h).
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
236. INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2000).
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complexity of the criminal law, the dangers of relying on labels of
crimes, and the multiple interests involved. Indeed, many recent
changes in immigration law that relate to the criminal justice
system have been noteworthy for the lack of thought and process
provided by Congress.237 The dilemma is, therefore, how to allow for
such an overhaul without incurring the danger of further undermin-
ing fairness through a poor legislative process.
One solution would be to set up a commission to look comprehen-
sively at the criminal grounds of inadmissibility. Such a commission
could undertake the task of developing a new set of rules, or could
develop a procedure, such as a standing commission like the
sentencing commission, which would be available to revise and
adjust the rules in light of experience. Either way, the use of a
commission could assist in depoliticizing the process of evaluating
the history of those applying to immigrate or to adjust to permanent
status.
Any overhaul of the criminal inadmissibility grounds must
answer four questions: (1) which offenses are irrelevant or suffi-
ciently minor that they need not be part of the criteria for determin-
ing admission to the country; (2) which offenses are sufficiently
serious that they should be a bar regardless of the equities; (3) if a
waiver is permitted, what should be the criteria for granting the
waiver; and (4) under what circumstances should inadmissibility be
determined on the basis of facts outside a criminal record.
An advantage of using a commission to address these questions
is that it can take on the questions systematically, with the insight
of criminal justice professionals who are familiar with a range of
petty and serious offenses processed through the criminal justice
system. In addition, a commission can be assigned to consider these
questions on their own, rather than as bargaining chips to be traded
in broader debates over immigration reform. Although politics will
inevitably find its way into any overhaul of criminal inadmissibility
grounds, a commission provides some chance at a more sensible and
thoughtful approach to a system that is indefensible but difficult to
change.
237. See sources cited supra note 43.
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CONCLUSION
The drug grounds for inadmissibility and the rules for waivers of
inadmissibility are the by-product of seriously flawed legislative
process. The legislative patchwork that emerged from this process
is out of touch with the reality of the public's experimentation with
drugs both domestically and abroad. The law suffers from multiple
flaws. It allows mere concession of past drug possession to trigger
bars to admission to the country, thereby allowing selective inter-
rogation of immigrants to determine who is allowed to immigrate.
It adopts a virtual zero-tolerance policy for lifetime drug use, in the
face of statistics that show widespread lifetime experimentation
with drugs. And in the one place that the law offers some room for
discretion, it relies on a form of marijuana exceptionalism that
denies other minor offenders a chance to demonstrate their equities.
Whatever one's views about controlled substances, it is hardly
sensible to have an immigration system that bars access to family
members, workers, and exceptional artists and scientists based on
past conduct that is so widespread and can be so remote in time.
The experience of the FBI, which has rejected similar backwards
zero-tolerance rules, is particularly telling. It is time for Congress
to undo the damage.
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